Most Oneidas took up the American cause during the Revolutionary, serving it with fidelity and effectiveness. Among many places Oneida warriors engaged the British was one far distant from the Oneida homeland, a quiet crossroads in eastern Pennsylvania called Barren Hill.
Historians who have examined the skirmish at Barren Hill affirm that Oneida warriors were cowards. Upon encountering a British unit, Oneidas flung aside their weapons and fled in terror. A more detailed consideration suggests the opposite conclusion. Not only did the Oneidas fight well, their action was crucial to averting an American disaster. They retreated, as did the entire American column, but they were the last to withdraw and they almost certainly did so as requested by American officers.
The primary reason for such discrepant conclusions is that earlier historians accepted uncritically a few accounts of the action which reflect first, a pervasive sense of cultural superiority on the part of non-native record keepers, and second, a strong tendency to refer to Indians only when they are a subject of jest.
Possible bias is, of course, no news to anyone researching native activities in documentary records written by non-native people. Any competent researcher, suspecting the scribes may have been indifferent or unsympathetic to a native presence, tries to take bias into critical account. The difficulty is that one can rarely define such bias with any clarity. Understanding its effect on a given body of information is even more difficult.
Barren Hill provides an instructive instance in this respect because here the source and the nature of the bias can be plausibly identified. The joke with its ethnocentric attitude originated with the American commander -- the Marquis de Lafayette and his circle of gentlemen-officers. Viewed in this fashion, much of the primary written evidence about Barren Hill is not really concerned with what we would regard as objective, factual description. On the contrary, the most frequently quoted statements about Barren Hill more closely resemble news management.
A second virtue of the Barren Hill incident as a case study in bias is that here we can infer the motives of those providing the information. I think it must be reasonably clear why Lafayette and his friends told the story with its pejorative nuances. Lafayette’s first battlefield command had very nearly resulted in military calamity for the American cause. Whether he told the story as he did consciously (putting the best possible construction on the outcome) or unconsciously (being "in denial"), he had had a very close call and, probably rightly, he wished to emphasize only what was positive.
A third strength of Barren Hill as cautionary example is that we can see how the bias actually affected historical judgment. I hope to demonstrate this by presenting below a composite summary of previous historical treatments of Oneidas at Barren Hill ("A Conventional History"). That section is then contrasted to a more detailed and Oneida-centered account of the same incident ("A Revised History").
Chesnoy's 1778 color map of the Barren Hill action
follow this link for a larger, detailed version of this map
In mid March of 1778, the newly appointed commander of the Northern Department, twenty-year-old Lafayette, attempted to enlist Oneidas for service in Washington's army. The Americans, then wintering at Valley Forge, confronted Howe's British army also in winter bivouac at nearby Philadelphia. Washington had requested the recruitment of native allies believing that Indians would be useful in an anticipated spring campaign of movement.
Lafayette immediately replied to Washington:
Lafayette understood a condition of the Oneidas to be the construction of a picket fort in their principal village of Kanonwalohale or Oneida Castle. He therefore arranged that, after the Oneidas cut the wood, a French engineer would design the fortification and the Tryon County [Mohawk Valley] militia would build it. "Then I hope I'l be able to get here [Valley Forge], and perhaps to bring down to your excellency some scalping gentlemen for dressing the fine hair of the Howe actually dancing in Philadelphia" (ibid.:370). "The love of French blood," he exalted several days later, "mix'd with the love of some french louis d'or [gold coins] have engaged those indians to promise they would come with me" (Reed 1986:29).
After the stockade presumably was completed, a Frenchman, Louis de Tousard, accompanied the Oneidas to Valley Forge and recorded their arrival there on May 13, 1778. "After a long and tedious march, I am at length arrived at General Washington's quarters with seven and fourthy [forty] Indians...I was pretty much troubled in the Road by some of the Indians who remain'd behind in order to get drinking with more ease" (Tousard to Willett, May 16, 1778).
In camp, the Indians seemed ludicrously colorful. A French officer on Lafayette's staff recalled two "singular incidents" concerning the Oneidas:
"One day we were at dinner at head-quarters; an Indian entered the room, walked round the table, and then stretching forth his long tattooed arm seized a large joint of roast beef in his thumb and fingers, took it to the door, and began to eat it. We were all much surprised, but General Washington gave orders that he was not to be interfered with, saying laughingly, that it was apparently the dinner hour of this Mutius Scaevola of the New World [a Roman who maimed himself; the referent being the tattooed Oneida].
"On another occasion a chief came into the room where our generals were holding a council of war. Washington, who was tall and very strong, rose, coolly took the Indian by the shoulders, and put him outside the door. The son of the forest did not protest; he concluded probably that this ejectment was a way of expressing by signs that his company was not wanted" (Douglas 1898:49-50).
That spring, the Americans correctly suspected that the British would soon be evacuating Philadelphia. Seeking clarification, General Washington dispatched a large column of some 2,200 men to sound out the British situation. He placed Lafayette in command with strict instructions to take no chances and to stay on the move. Lafayette proceeded halfway to Philadelphia on May 19, then settled into camp at a little hamlet called Barren Hill.
The Oneida warriors were among Lafayette's command at Barren Hill. One American soldier, Private Joseph Plumb Martin, vividly recalled them when he committed his memories to paper some four decades later:
"About this time I was sent off from camp in a detachment consisting of about three thousand men, with four fieldpieces, under the command of the young General Lafayette. We marched to Barren Hill, about twelve miles from Philadelphia. There are crossroads upon this hill, a branch of which leads to the city. We halted here, placed out guards, sent off our scouting parties, and waited for -- I know not what.
"A company of about a hundred Indians, from some northern tribe, joined us here. There were three or four young Frenchmen with them. The Indians were stout-looking fellows and remarkably neat for that race of mortals, but they were Indians.
"There was upon the hill, and just where we were lying, an old church built of stone, entirely divested of all its entrails. The Indians were amusing themselves and the soldiers by shooting with their bows, in and about the church. I observed something in a corner of the roof which did not appear to belong to the building, and desired an Indian who was standing near me to shoot an arrow at it. He did so and it proved to be a cluster of bats; I should think there were nearly a bushel of them, all hanging upon one another. The house was immediately alive with them, and it was likewise instantly full of Indians and soldiers. The poor bats fared hard; it was sport for all hands. They killed I know not how many, but there was a great slaughter among them. I never saw so many bats before or since, nor indeed in my whole life put all together" (Martin 1995:118-19).
Spies reported Lafayette's encampment at Barren Hill to the British in Philadelphia. Outnumbering the Americans at least four to one, the royal forces marched out of the city to encircle the rebel force during the night of May 19th.
One British column under Grant, coming from the east, would approach an intersection only three miles from the American encampment then, turning north, would get between Lafayette and Valley Forge (via Swede's Ford). A second detachment under Grey (or perhaps a portion of the first), would proceed west from that intersection straight toward the exposed American left flank at Barren Hill (the American right flank was on a bluff overlooking the Schuylkill River). Meanwhile, a substantial force under the command of Howe and his recently arrived replacement (Clinton) moved north along Ridge Road, the most direct route from Philadelphia, straight toward the American front and left flank. These approaches and Lafayette's topographic situation are illustrated in the accompanying map prepared by Lafayette's aide-de-camp, Chesnoy.
Apparently no contemporary account has survived of Lafayette's growing awareness of danger and his reactions to the British movements on the morning of May 20th. Later accounts are vague as to time and furnish contradictory details about the overall chronology. Early on, however, Lafayette knew of some British presence to the east or northeast and responded by extending his positions across the Ridge ("Rich" on map) Road to include the Barren Hill church and cemetery (shown and described at "h" on Chesnoy’s map).
As Private Martin remembered this:
"Just at dawn of the day the officers' waiters came, almost breathless, after the horses. Upon inquiring for the cause of the unusual hurry, we were told
that the British were advancing upon us in our rear. How they could get there was to us a mystery, but they were there. We helped the waiters to catch their horses and immediately returned to the main body of the detachment. We found the troops all under arms and in motion, preparing for an onset. Those of the troops belonging to our brigade were put into the churchyard, which was enclosed by a wall of stone and lime about breast high, a good defense against musketry but poor against artillery. I began to think I should soon have some better sport than killing bats. But our commander found that the enemy was too strong to be engaged in the position we then occupied. He therefore wisely ordered a retreat from this place to the Schuylkill, where [after crossing the river] we might choose any position that we pleased, having ragged woody hills in our rear and the river in front" (ibid.:119-20).
Five or more years later, Lafayette stated that, after moving the front as described:
"[He] found himself cut off from the rear by Grant on the road to Swede's Ford. At the same time, he [Lafayette referred to himself in the third person] learned that Howe, Clinton, and the rest of the army were advancing along the road from Philadelphia. He was in the presence of the troops when he heard the cry that they were surrounded, and he had to smile at that sad news. Several officers who had been dispatched to Valley Forge declared that they could not find a passage through the enemy's lines. Every minute was precious, and M. de Lafayette took the road to Matson's Ford, to which the enemy was closer than he was" (Idzerda 2:7).
Lafayette then retired in good order toward the northwest to Matson's Ford where his troops waded across the Schuylkill to safety. The British did not contest the crossing, a circumstance Lafayette attributed to his own skillful maneuvering which had misled the enemy into a posture of defense.
Among the first reports of Barren Hill available to the public was one distributed by Henry Laurens, President of Congress who happened to be in nearby York, Pennsylvania. On May 27, Laurens sent the following account, an anonymously written enclosure, to Francis Hopkinson:
"The Marquis delafayette having been detached from the Main Army with 2100 Picked Men & Selected Officers_ aided by 45 Indians & about ten french Men in the Indian Corp_ proceeded (on the 19 May) toward Philadelphia to observe the Motions of the Enemy & to make such advantages as circumstances should throw in his way_
"On the 20th a proper Chain of Guards & Sentries were posted to avoid surprize but however vigilant these were, the Enemy having received intelligence of the Marquis's motions by some means unknown to us, probably, from those worse than common Enemies, the Tories, Marched out in large force supposed to be at least 6000_ about Midnight, & (by a circuitous course) passed beyond the Marquis's detachment & then divided by different routs [sic.] in order to surround the American Troops_ it then became necessary for the Marquis to Retreat_ the Retreat was executed in most admirable order in presence of the Enemy's advanced parties of Horse_ General Clinton who (it is said) commanded the British was so effectively deceived by the Retreat he judged it was an attempt to draw him into a Snare...
"[T]he Marquis's retreat has done him more honor than he would have gained by a drawn battle or slight Victory" (Chesnutt 13:346-47).
The probable author was Laurens' son, John, one of Washington's staff officers who had accompanied his friend Lafayette on the Barren Hill adventure. Various versions of the Laurens enclosure shortly appeared in newspapers throughout the colonies including the Pennsylvania Gazette on May 30, the Boston Gazette on June 22, and possibly Dunlop's Maryland Gazette in Baltimore (ibid.:footnote 5; Draper 11: 181).
The emphasis on Lafayette's coolness under pressure and adroitness in maneuver is echoed in the versions given by Lafayette in later writings, by the Marquis de Chastellux (who heard it from Lafayette himself in 1780), and by historians who have considered the incident (Tower 1895 1:337; Gottschalk 1937:192-93; Trussell 1990:113).
However, the Oneidas serving with Lafayette "proved to be a disappointment" (Trussell 1990:112). According to the Laurens enclosure:
"[T]he loss on our side was three Men Killed & four Prisoners_ the Enemy lost 2 Horsemen killed & six or eight wounded_ when the Indians had discharged their fire upon the light Horse they set up the War Whoop & according to their Custom scampered off_ the British light Horse terrified by the yelling of the Indians fled precepitantly the other way_ the Indian ked up several of their Cloaks & converted them into Boots" (Chesnutt 13:347).
Lafayette had posted the Oneidas in advance (south) of his position on Ridge Road, the direct route to Philadelphia. In his memoir, he stated that it was there "that fifty of our Indian allies met fifty British dragoons. The war cries on one side and the appearance of the cavalry on the other surprised the two parties so much that they fled with equal speed" (Idzerda 2:7). The Marquis de Chastellux elaborated on this vignette two and a half years later:
"As for General Howe's column, it was not long in reaching the advanced post of M. de La Fayette, which gave rise to a laughable enough adventure. The fifty Indians who had been assigned to La Fayette were placed in the woods, in ambush, after their manner, that is to say, lying as close as rabbits. Fifty English dragoons, at the head of the column, rode into the woods. They had never seen any Indians and the Indians had never seen any dragoons. So, up jumped the savages with a horrible cry, threw down their arms, and escaped to safety by swimming across the Schuylkill, while the dragoons, as frightened as they were, turned tail and fled in such a panic that they could not be stopped until they reached Philadelphia" (Rice 1963 1:171).
At least two other non-native people who had been involved in the Barren Hill incident believed the Oneidas had done nothing. A Hessian general, serving with the British, noted in his journal that the "Indians, who enjoyed undisturbed rest, returned unmolested across the Schuylkill in the night of the 20th-21st of May" (Uhlendorf 1957:176). Private Martin seemed to feel the Oneidas had been negligent in not warning the Americans of the impending encirclement. "The Indians, with all their alertness, had like to have 'bought the rabbit,'" he observed. From the safety of the western shore of the Schuylkill (Martin was among the rearguard of Lafayette's column), he also described how the Oneidas "kept coming in all the afternoon, in parties of four or five, whooping and hallooing like wild beasts. After they had got collected they vanished; I never saw any more of them" (Martin 1995:121).
Oneida cowardice is stated as a fact in the historical summaries of Barren Hill:
"The only encounter which actually took place occurred a little before that time with General Clinton's advance guard, and it was one of the most curious in the course of the war. A company of British dragoons, moving along the Ridge Road near Barren Hill, came suddenly upon the Iroquois of La Fayette's force, who were doing picket duty at that point: the savages started up from the ground with their mad warwhoop, and, terrified by the cavalry, which they had never seen before, they instantly fled; whilst the dragoons, on their side, were thrown into such disorder by a sight and a sound equally new to them, that they retreated hastily in the opposite direction" (Tower 1895 1:336).
"Meanwhile General Howe's army, starting out many hours later than Grant, had made contact with Captain McLane' kets [with whom the Oneidas were serving]. When a detachment of the British dragoons ran into Lafayette's party of Indians, each group was so surprised at the strange appearance of the other (for the Indians had never seen dragoons, and the dragoons had never seen Indians) that they ran away in opposite directions as fast as they could go" (Gottschalk 1937:190-91).
"[T]he British troopers, being totally unfamiliar with the savage war-cries, panicked and fled. In turn, the Indians, amazed and frightened at the gorgeous uniforms and threatening martial appearance of the dragoons, also took to their heels in search of safety...The Indians after their embarrassment at Barren Hill lingered about camp at Valley Forge with nothing further to gain but boredom" (Reed 1986:31-32).
The Oneidas first met the twenty-year-old Marquis de Lafayette at a meeting with American officials held at Johnstown, New York in early March, 1778.Whatever they thought of Lafayette personally, they liked what he represented. Lafayette embodied France on the side of the American rebels and his presence made real the prospect of French aid.
Until the
end of
the
French and Indian War, the French had been essential to an Iroquois policy which
played off English and French interests to Iroquois advantage. A number of Oneidas
had long-standing personal and family ties with French people and more Oneidas
probably spoke French than English.These
were perhaps sufficient
reasons for renewing ties with their French "father," but they had a better
one. In August of the previous year, the Oneidas committed to the American cause
when they helped to repel
(in fighting at Oriskany and Fort Stanwix) a British invasion passing through
their homeland. As soon as Oneida warriors formally took
up the war hatchet on behalf of the United States in September, they hurried
north to help American forces at Saratoga.
The Oneida Nation did as much as any group of comparable size to secure these key American victories, triumphs enabling France to enter the war the war with decisive results. Oneidas, therefore, had reason to believe their actions contributed to the return of France to American soil and to the appearance of Frenchmen ready to fight beside them.Not surprisingly, the Johnstown meeting turned out to be a serious affirmation of Oneida intent to prosecute the war. One of the Oneida spokesmen -- it would have been Ojistalale (the Grasshopper), speaker for the sachems, or Agwilondonwas (Good Peter), speaker for the warriors -- "declared the unalterable Resolution of the Oneidas & Tuscarorers [Tuscaroras, younger brothers to the Oneidas who were living in Oneida territory], at every hazard, to hold fast the Covenant Chain with the [U]nited States, and with them to be buried in the same Grave; or to enjoy the Fruites of Victory and Peace" (Duane to Clinton, March 13, 1778).
The Oneidas welcomed the French, moving to strengthen their links to that people by taking Lafayette into their own family. Lafayette understood that he was being adopted by the Oneidas when they bestowed on him the name of a deceased warrior: Kayewla (Gottschalk 1950:97). The Oneidas may have been raising up (and metaphorically bringing back to life in the person of Lafayette) a highly respected leader who had passed away twelve years before. (That person’s name often was written as "Gawehe," as in Johnson 12:121,126.)
At the Johnstown conference, the Oneidas asked that a fort be built within their village. The request was neither new nor unreasonable. As Philip Schuyler, the most energetic of the American Indian Commissioners of the Northern Department, had explained to Congress at the beginning of the year:
"[The Oneidas] are still very friendly; but, so far from being capable of an active part, are under well grounded apprehensions of falling victims to the rage of their savage neighbors. They call upon the United States, in whose cause whey took up the hatchet, and are in danger, to protect them, and it is become indispensably necessary to erect some fortress, and station a small garrison in their country, for the security of their women and children. We flatter ourselves that the Commanding Officer of this department will have instructions to receive our information, and to make immediate preparations for the defence of the frontiers and protection of our allies" (New York Historical Society 1880:199).
Lafayette
inherited the obligation to build the fort at precisely the moment he was asking
the Oneidas to send warriors to Pennsylvania. His request to the Oneidas 
was
accompanied by wampum belts -- these testified to the truth and importance of
the message -- and money. Both parties expected that goods and sometimes money
would be given in such transactions. In the native view, these gifts reciprocated
past actions and anticipated others in the future.
Oneidas did not receive soldiers' pay for military service, although they needed what money could buy. Iroquois people depended on foreign goods including guns and gunpowder, metal tools and traps, cooking pots and cloth for their livelihood. While the British could supply their native allies, the poverty-stricken Americans could not. This was already apparent in 1778 to Oneida leader Agwilondonwas
"[The Loyalist Iroquois] are wallowing in plenty, while we are pining in poverty and all this is occasioned by our attachment to you. Brothers-- It is well known that the Defection of part of our Confederacy is owing to the frequent presents made them by the King, but we are determined to adhere to you" (Penrose 1981:160).
It was equally clear to General Washington:
"I am sorry to observe that the disposition of the Indian Nations is not generally so favorable, as could be wished; but it is not to be wondered at, when we consider the advantages the enemy possess over us, in the means of supplying their wants and rewarding their friendship" (Ford 1890:8).
Certainly the Oneidas had reason to expect the Frenchman's gold coins and to receive his gifts politely. In sending a group of warriors far to the south, the Oneidas were complying with a request, at great risk and cost to themselves, that even the American Indian Commissioners found unreasonable (Penrose 1981:122). Lafayette was mistaken if he really thought the Oneidas agreed to this because he had bribed them. Accepting the Marquis’ money as a token of gratitude, Oneidas never supposed they were selling their loyalty and manpower.
Tousard, delegated by Lafayette to oversee palisade construction and the dispatch of Oneida warriors, reported in late April, 1778:
"Having received orders of the General Marquis De la fayette to go with Lt. Col. Gouvion to help him in building the fort of the Oneidas, and in engaging their warriors to join the army of His Excellency General Washington, I went to their Castle, and after a month of Deliberations, I received their promise to send a party of Indians to join the army...
"The day before we went from Fort Schuyler [Stanwix], the whole nation of Oneidas was met to receive the presents which the honourable Congress had favored them with, for their constant affection to the United States of America. The Chiefs addressed them the speech of which I send you the traduction [translation]"(Tousard to Laurens, May 23, 1778).
Even though the stockade apparently was not completed, the Oneidas agreed to assist Washington’s army. There followed at Fort Stanwix the customary session of formal oratory in which the sachems (peace chiefs holding ancient titles of office in the Iroquois Confederacy) counseled their metaphorical nephews, the warriors, on proper behavior. Since non-native observers considered such interchanges as excessively tedious, the speaker for the sachems, Ojistalale, probably abbreviated his advice that day.
"An Adress [sic.] of the Oneida Sachems to a Party of young warriors bound to General Washington conducted by Mr. De Tousard
"Nephews, Warriors open your ears. You are now parting with your uncles the sachems. Tis common on such occasion to speak a few words. Young warriors often need advice. You are undertaking a long march; you will be exposed to fatigues and many temptations, and many will be your observers-- not only Americans, but some chiefs & warriors from our father the french king.
"Keep in mind that warriors sustain an important character, they can do much good or commit great enormities. They are to do good by removing out of the way such evils as threaten the peace of the country. Here they may display the hero, but private revenge is to be carefully avoid'd. To abuse and plunder a helpless (and it may be innocent) family is beneath the character of a warrior.
"Nephews, Keep in mind, you are bound to the Grand army of America, and will be introduced to General Washington the Chief Warrior, and to a great officer of our father the french king the Marquis Delafayette at whose particular application you go. Any misconduct in you, if only a little, will be of extensive influence, the reproach not easily whiped [sic.] away. Therefore observe a line of conduct proper for warriors. Let there always be a good argument behind you. Be always of one mind, have one object in view & don't let every one think himself a head warrior or that he may use all those freedoms which are indulged at home, but let one and all yield implicid obedience to Mr. De Tousard who will conduct you in the march and fight with you.
"Beware of strong liquor the common beguiler of Indians. Nephews if you observe good order, sobriety and play the man-- your deportment in this case will resound through the American army, be noticed by general Washington the Chief Warrior and finally reach the ears of our father the french king-- and we sachems shall then rejoice to hear from you...
"To the above the warriors reply'd. Return'd thanks for their good advice, promising implicid obedience to Mr. De Tousard their conductor-- that the good agreement should subsist betwixt them and clos'd with appointed exhortation to the sachems to maintain one uniform line of council in their deliberations, pursue them with resolution and not restrain the warrior. Fort Schuyler, April 24, 1778" (ibid.).
Tousard reported the arrival of forty-seven Oneidas at Valley Forge and, though he found the journey troublesome, "the totality behaved well enough, and we arrived the 13th of the present without any accident nor complaints against them" (Tousard to Willett, May 16, 1778).
The
next day, the Oneidas were shown around the encampment and welcomed with a thirteen-gun
salute (Reed 1986:30). One of Washington's guardsmen noted in his journal that
on May 15, "The Ingen [Indian] Chief Come to Head Quarters to Congratelate with
His Exelency and also Dined with him" (Godfrey 1972:276).
Four days later, the Oneidas moved out with Lafayette's reconnoitering force in the direction of Philadelphia. They, along with fifty of Daniel Morgan's Virginia riflemen under Captain Parr, were assigned to a special detachment of scouts under the overall command of Captain Allen McLane. Through the eyes of Private Martin, we have seen the Oneidas arrive at Barren Hill on May 19. Soon after, McLane's company took up picket duty on the Ridge Road in front (south) of the main American encampment. That location apparently is indicted on the Barren Hill map at the letter "d" but captioned at "c": "Compagnie franche du Capitaine McLain augmentie du 50 Sauvages Iroquois qui etaint au point" [Captain McLain's Frank or French company augmented by 50 Iroquois savages at the point]. McLane's force "was posted in advance of Lafayette's position about one mile. At night, however, it usually advanced towards the enemy's lines" (Graham 1856:193).
By settling down at Barren Hill, Lafayette had immediately disobeyed Washington's order to remain mobile. What he hoped to accomplish by this is unclear since, according to his memoir, the only thing Lafayette did at Barren Hill was to chat with a young lady willing to go into Philadelphia to spy for him (Idzerda 2:6-7). In contrast, the British were well informed about Lafayette. They were already in motion to encircle the supine marquis and his 2,200 soldiers.
Sometime
on the morning of May 20, McLane' kets encountered the front of the Howe-Clinton
column -- a group of dragoons or mounted infantry -- moving
north on the Ridge Road. Since McLane himself was not present, Capt. Parr immediately
led the small force of Oneidas and riflemen forward to engage the British in
a brief but "very animated contest" (Graham 1856:194). Tousard, writing three
days after the event, provided eyewitness testimony:
"I have had the occasion to acquaint the british light horses with the hollow [halloo or war cry?] of the Indians, and their ability in firing; but I have lost three french men on the spot, one of 'em was barbarously murdered, his tongue & ears cut off [that is, by the enemy]. Four were made prisoners, and myself owe my liberty, perhaps more to two Indians, and two french men who stood constantly by me, and kill'd two light horse at whose fire my horse had throwd me down, and who were close by me. I cannot tell the exact number of the light horse killed, but my people fired pretty smart though running away, and I have seen my self five or six killed" (Tousard to Laurens, May 23, 1778).
What Tousard meant by firing pretty smartly "though running away" is clarified by an account of the action from the perspective of Morgan's riflemen:
"Advancing down the Ridge road, upon the news of the enemy's approach being made known, Parr soon after encountered their advanced guard, which he immediately attacked. The enemy, promptly deploying into line, returned the fire of Parr's party; and for some minutes, the conflict was warm and bloody, several being killed and wounded on both sides. At length, hearing a fire at some distance in his rear, and perceiving the main body of Grey's [Howe's] troops coming up to the support of its advance guard, Parr and his command commenced a rapid retreat" (Graham 1856:194-95).
The Oneidas
withdrew firing and under heavy fire, in an orderly but rapid fashion, and under
orders. Like the entire American force, they apparently retreated 
across
Matson's Ford. But the Oneidas, as Private Martin testified, were the last of
Lafayette's command to cross the Schuylkill River. It doesn't seem very important
to know whether they swam or waded across like the rest of the retreating Americans
who resembled "corks in a net" according to a British observer (Tower 1895 1:336).
Private Martin noted how the Oneidas collected and moved off. What Martin did not realize was that the Oneidas had just volunteered to go back after the British. They were part of an American detachment which attempted, unsuccessfully, to inflict some damage on the British before they got back to Philadelphia (Graham 1856:196).The Oneida skirmish was apparently the only clash that occurred in the Barren Hill incident and it proved to be crucial to the success of the American retreat. Graham, working from the papers of Daniel Morgan, asserted that the British design to encircle Lafayette's command was "happily frustrated by the vigilance of a party of observation, composed of Captain McLane's company, Captain Parr's detachment of the rifle corps, and a body of Indians" (ibid.:193).
The
circumstantial evidence of Lafayette's reaction to the British presence on the
morning of the 20th favors the same conclusion. Lafayette did not initially
withdraw, rather he moved the American front to a position indicating anticipated
trouble from the east and northeast (see Chesnoy map). If he knew the British
were there, he surely understood the enemy was in position to block the road
to the north (to Swede's Ford and Valley Forge) and to the nearby Matson's Ford.
It looks as though he remained unconcerned about encirclement until learning,
presumably from the Oneida-dragoon clash, that the enemy also was approaching
from the south.
Chastellux's account, received from Lafayette in 1780, confirms this. Following his anecdote about the Oneidas flinging down their arms and fleeing across the river, Chastellux immediately added, "M. de La Fayette now realized that he had been outflanked" (Rice 1963 1:171). Only at that moment did Lafayette perceive he would have to attempt immediate retreat. Indeed, the tactical significance of the Ridge Road skirmish must have been clear to the American command who commended the unit in which the Oneidas served. Capt. McLane "and his men got much honor for their service and were officially thanked for their 'vigilancy,' which enabled the marquis to make 'a glorious retreat as well as a safe one'" (Ward 1952 2:567).
It was common knowledge that Barren Hill had nearly been an American disaster. Henry Dearborn, an officer who remained at Valley Forge during the incident, noted in his journal:
"20th [May] this morning at 8 o Clock we ware alarmd & the whole army Turnd out -- in Consequence of hearing that the Detachment that march'd yesterday are Surrounded by 7000 brittish Troops & no other way for them to Escape but by fording the Schuylkill which was Perform'd in Sight of the Enimy. the army Lay under armes until night When finding that the Enimy after a small scurmish with a Party of our Anydo Indions Retired into Philadelphia it was a very Luckey afair on our side, that we Did not Loose our whole Detatchment, our only Loss was 6 of my frenchmen" (Brown and Peckham 1971:121).
Publicly, Washington praised Lafayette's "timely and handsome retreat;" privately he mused that the success of the withdrawal could be due to Lafayette's dexterity "or the enemy's want of it" (Fitzpatrick 11:443; Gottschalk 1937:193). American enthusiasm for Lafayette's skills in generalship was more restrained than the widely printed account which Henry Laurens circulated (quoted earlier) might suggest. Another press release of the time (dated May 24), authored by an anonymous gentleman at Valley Forge, stated:
"Last week the marquis de la Fayette, with 2100 men, crossed the river below the Swedes ford, towards germantown. The enemy having been apprised of this, sent out 8000 men, headed by Generals Clinton and Grant, to surround the marquis's detachment, which they had like to have affected; but the marquis discovering their superior numbers and near approach, made a good, though rapid, retreat, at a critical moment through the Schuylkill, three miles below the above mentioned ford, which, by way of example to the troops, the marquis was the first to plunge into" (North Carolina Gazette, June 26, 1778).
What if, after the terrible winter from which the American army emerged with a new sense of professionalism, the Americans had lost the flower of their forces -- over 2,000 "hand-picked" men and something like a fifth of the army -- in pointless maneuver a dozen miles from the American camp? This unpleasant possibility has been considered from the perspective of Lafayette's place in American history.
"If the misfortune had overtaken him then of being captured by the British, upon the first occasion when he had been intrusted with a separate command, involving as it would have done, the loss to the Continental army of an extremely valuable body of men, the chances are that he would have been overwhelmed by the consequences, and that his influence would have been damaged beyond repair. The hold he had at that time upon the affairs of the nation was comparatively slight; it might have been broken, and the memory of La Fayette would have become that of a mere incident in the War of Independence; he would not have had an opportunity to render to this country the valuable services which he rendered afterward, in the councils of war, and in his relations with the French Government and with the French troops in America, as well as on the field of battle" (Tower 1895 1:338).
Why was Oneida participation at Barren Hill treated so pejoratively in many of the sources?
Part of the answer is simple ethnocentrism, the assumption that another culture is inferior to one's own. The most vivid description of Oneidas at Barren Hill is surely to be found in the recollections of Private Joseph Plumb Martin quoted extensively above. Martin saw in these warriors, with their bows and arrows at the church, something so s to suggest he had never seen Indians. Nevertheless, he had strong preconceptions on the subject. They were, as he says, only Indians after all. Like other non-native observers quoted in this paper, Martin reached easily for descriptive terms evoking savagery and beastliness. And, since Private Martin incorrectly assumed that Oneida negligence was to blame for the near entrapment of the Americans, this was bias which affected his judgment and the interpretations of subsequent historians.
His reminiscences are not, however, the primary source for the oft-repeated description which holds that, never having seen an enemy on horseback, the panic-stricken Oneidas flung aside their weapons and dove into the river to escape. Leaving aside some embroidery in the retelling, this account derives from dependence on a single interpretation which originated with Lafayette and his circle.
The account probably was first set to paper on the enclosure distributed by Henry Laurens and subsequently published in newspapers throughout the colonies. Whether or not the author was Lafayette's friend, John Laurens, the narrative so closely resembles what Lafayette later told the Marquis de Chastellux and, still later, wrote himself, that we are clearly dealing with a common source reflecting an agreed-upon outlook.
Since the
purpose of the report is to extol Lafayette's soldierly skills, it seems odd,
at first glance, that Oneidas are mentioned at all. Perhaps they needed to be
mentioned
since some contemporaries knew Indians contributed to Lafayette's apparent success.
Denigrating their actions would perhaps enhance the role played by Lafayette.
In any event, allusion to the Oneidas occurs as comic relief, a humorous aside intended for the reader's amusement. Lafayette customarily assumed this facetious tone when describing Indians to an audience of American gentlemen officers (as for example, his remarks about Oneidas to George Washington quoted earlier).
This was Lafayette's personal voice within the context of 18th-century gentility. A worldview of con uous affectation and posture, gentility required constant presentation of self as the epitome of wit, elegance, and superior knowledge (Taylor 1996:13-14,143,301). It was an outlook of class that went far beyond Private Martin's garden variety ethnocentrism to assume superiority in all forms of taste and judgment within the same culture. It was a "protean ideal" which colored how the genteel perceived and explained the world to one another (Bushman 1991:353). Perusing the records left by such people (most records of the time) is an exercise in confronting a culture nearly as foreign to us today as that of the 18th-century Iroquois.
The incident at Barren Hill nicely illustrates the historiagraphical difficulties of working with such documentation. The accounts of reality on which we depend to know about Oneidas in the Revolutionary require critical scrutiny. Often suspect by virtue of their pronounced cultural bias, some accounts seem actually to have been written to place Oneidas in an unfavorable light.
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References Cited
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